A model of the continuous double auction is constructed and analysed. Given the underlying supply and demand functions, the analysis yields steady-state probability distributions for the best ask, best bid and transaction prices. Under fairly general assumptions it is found that these prices are confined to a clearly defined window. Expressions are also obtained for the depth of the order book at arbitrary prices, and for the expected time-to-execution of a given order. These can be used to calculate the optimal order price for a trader with a specified level of impatience, to determine when a market order is preferable to a limit order, and hence in some cases to detect the presence of irrational or ill-informed traders in the market. It is conjectured that, in a market of rational and well-informed traders, the two sides of the order book should be statistically independent.
The most efficient markets are generally those in which there is active competition between buyers as well as sellers. If the traded goods are completely standardized, a trader competes by declaring the price and quantity of goods she is willing to buy or sell. For such a declaration to be credible, it must constitute a firm offer.
A continuously operating market for standardized goods in which both buyers and sellers can announce offers to trade specified quantities at specified prices, and can also initiate trades by accepting such offers, is known as a 'continuous double auction ' (CDA) . This mechanism provides a natural multilateral generalization of the familiar process of haggling. It has been found in laboratory experiments to give very rapid convergence to a competitive equilibrium, as discussed by Smith (1962) and Smith et al (1982) , and also to yield extremely efficient allocations. A number of relevant studies are surveyed by Friedman (1993) .
The CDA mechanism is especially well-suited to the needs of modern financial markets, and is the basis of nearly all the automated trading systems that have been implemented in such markets over the last two decades. Such systems utilize an electronic 'order book', in which unexecuted or partially executed orders are stored and displayed while awaiting execution.
Countless versions of the CDA mechanism exist, each characterized by the types of orders that may be submitted and the way in which these are handled. In practice most automated exchanges operate primarily as limit order markets, and accept orders of the following basic types:
• Limit orders-orders to buy a specified quantity at a price not exceeding some specified maximum, or to sell a specified quantity at a price not less than a specified minimum. If it can be matched with any of the opposing orders already queued in the order book, a new limit order is immediately executed against the most competitive of these at the best available price. Otherwise, it joins the queue of unexecuted sells or buys in the order book and remains there until it is either cancelled or else executed against a subsequent order.
• Market orders-orders to buy or sell a specified quantity at the best price currently available. A market order is executed immediately and as fully as possible. Any unexecuted part may then be converted to a limit order at the same price (as on the Paris Bourse), or else executed at the next best available price (as on the Australian Stock Exchange).
Although some exchanges utilize hybrid systems, an increasing number (including the major exchanges in Paris, Tokyo, Toronto, Hong Kong, Sydney, Mumbai and Stockholm) function as pure limit order markets. Glosten (1994) argues that exchanges operating in this manner are not only good providers of liquidity in extreme situations, but are also immune to competition from other exchanges.
In a limit order market, transaction prices are determined by the interaction of incoming orders with the order book. An understanding of this interaction is therefore required to properly model price formation and the stochastic properties of price fluctuations. This has motivated several empirical studies of real limit order markets, including those by Biais et al (1995) , Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) , Maslov and Mills (2001) , Bouchaud et al (2002) , and Potters and Bouchaud (2002) .
A tractable model of the order book would be of considerable value, but the development of such a model has been hindered by the inherent complexity of limit order markets. Most investigations reported in the finance literature, such as those by Chakravarty and Holden (1995) and Parlour (1998) , have focused on the strategies available to traders and market makers but provide limited insight into the statistical properties of the order book.
Instead of attempting to anticipate how traders will behave, the approach taken here is to start by supposing that their combined effect is to generate flows of buy and sell orders with known price distributions. The next step is to determine as much as possible about the resulting price distribution of the orders stored in the book, and the distribution of transaction prices. This is similar to the approach used by Garman (1976) although he did not attempt to develop a solvable model (except for the simple case in which all orders are made at a single price). It is also related to the approach used by Domowitz and Wang (1994) , though their results are invalid due to an error in the proof of their main theorem (as discussed in appendix B).
The final step is to partially close the model by investigating the way in which the properties of the order book can, in turn, influence the order flow. This is done by identifying optimal order placement strategies for traders with specified levels of impatience, taking into account the cost of execution delays. If all traders are assumed to be rational and informed, then some collection of these optimal strategies should be able to reproduce the order flow assumed at the outset. If not, then the postulated form of the order flow can be rejected as inconsistent with trader rationality.
In this way it is possible to eliminate various plausible models of order flow, such as those occurring in markets with price-independent elasticities of supply and demand. (Hopefully it may also be possible to find a general characterization of markets that are consistent with trader rationality, although this has not yet been achieved.)
As with all theoretical models, certain assumptions are made in order to render the problem tractable. These are described in detail in section 1, and are summarized in essence by the statement that no price-sensitive information enters the market or diffuses within it during the period of interest. Briefly, the situation envisaged is one in which large numbers of investors trade single units of an asset over an unbroken period, during which there are no external events affecting the underlying supply and demand. All traders have access to full historical data but, due to the high frequency of trades and delays in accessing data and transmitting orders, cannot respond quickly enough to take advantage of temporary anomalies that might appear in the order book. Instead they place anticipatory limit orders and market orders, guided by their knowledge of the statistical properties of the order book.
Other researchers have considered models with some of these features. For example, Mendelson (1982) used renewal theory to analyse a clearing house (sealed bid double auction) mechanism under assumptions similar to those described above, and an additional assumption of price-independent order arrival rates. More recently, Maslov (2000) has used computer simulations to study a model market in which traders randomly submit market or limit orders for fixed quantities of shares, each new limit order price being offset from the current market price by a random variable with a uniform distribution. The models of Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) and of Daniels et al (2001) are somewhat similar except that limit order prices are offset from the opposing quote. The latter model, which assumes that limit orders arrive with the same frequency at every possible price, has been analysed in some detail by Smith et al (2002) who also used numerical simulations to estimate quantities of interest such as the expected density of orders in the book and their expected times-to-execution for a variety of parameter choices.
In all these models, price movements are driven by purely by technical considerations, without reference to any fundamentals. Chiarella and Iori (2002) have constructed a somewhat more realistic (and hence more complex) model, in which traders employ a variety of pricing strategies that can take into account both technical and fundamental factors. As this model appears not to be amenable to theoretical analysis, conclusions must be inferred from simulation data obtained with specific parameter choices and so it is difficult to judge the extent of their generality.
The model of Foucault et al (2001) is also similar in some respects to that presented here. In particular, these authors assume that all orders are for a single unit; that traders cannot respond to detailed information about the state of the order book; and that orders cannot be cancelled. However, they make an additional assumption that new limit orders must narrow the spread by at least one tick, so that the order book can never contain more than one order at a given price. This forces all traders to compete against each other for priority, and denies patient traders the possibility of seeking better prices by placing less competitive orders.
Foucault et al also assume that transaction prices are confined within a fixed window, bounded above by a price at which outside investors stand ready to sell unlimited quantities of the asset, and bounded below by a price at which demand becomes infinite. The same assumption is made by Seppi (1997) , who postulates a large 'trading crowd' that is able to provide unlimited liquidity if the price moves outside a fixed window.
Such a price window occurs naturally in the model presented here, the boundary prices being determined by the form of the supply and demand functions. Section 1 presents a full description of the model and some rigorous results concerning the existence and the location of this window. It also gives expressions for the distributions of the best ask and bid prices, and of transaction prices, for arbitrary specified supply and demand functions. To illustrate these ideas, some specific examples are considered in sections 2 and 3.
Section 4 uses the results of the previous sections to analyse the optimization problem faced by a trader who must decide whether to place a market order or a limit order, and if the latter is chosen, must also price this order. Subject to some reasonable assumptions, this problem is found to have a straightforward solution. There follows a brief description of the properties of markets in which all traders use optimal order-placement strategies.
Although compelling in some respects the model presented here has clear limitations, which are discussed in section 5. Broadly speaking, its main deficiency is its inability to allow for the diffusion of information and the effect that this may have on trader behaviour; after all, information flow is an important factor in the dynamics of real financial markets. (For example, Potters and Bouchard (2002) conclude from their study of several French and British stocks that every trade is interpreted by the market as new information and thus has a lasting impact on the order book.) Nonetheless, the approach used here leads to a versatile and tractable benchmark model of a steady-state market, and may well be a useful starting point for the development of more sophisticated and realistic dynamical models.
The model
The CDA mechanism operates in various forms and in a wide variety of markets. (Broadly speaking these include all continuously functioning markets for standardized goods where there is active price competition between buyers as well as sellers, and in which there is no privileged 'dealer' responsible for clearing the market.) The model presented here is intended to encapsulate the essential and generic features of such markets rather than to accurately replicate any specific one. However, for clarity and definiteness, it can be regarded as a simplified representation of an order-driven securities exchange.
The basic ingredients of the model are sell and buy orders. A sell order or ask at the price α will mean a commitment to sell, at the first opportunity, at a price not less than α. A buy order or bid at the price β will mean a commitment to buy, at the first opportunity, at a price not exceeding β. Both are executable at a given price x ∈ (0, ∞) if α x and x β. Strictly speaking these are limit orders, although in the following pages this term will generally be reserved for orders that are not assured of immediate execution.
Orders submitted at sufficiently competitive prices will be immediately executed against existing asks or bids in the order book, just as though they were market orders. Consequently there is no need to specify a separate set of execution rules for market orders, which may conveniently be represented by very high-priced sell orders and very low-priced sell orders.
The model market is characterized by the following properties:
(A1) All orders are for a single unit. Hence, a buyer needs only to specify the maximum price she is prepared to pay, while a seller needs only to specify the minimum price she is prepared to accept. This eliminates the possibility of partial execution, and hence the need for rules governing the handling of partially executed orders. (A2) There are large numbers of potential buyers and sellers acting independently of one another, with each individual only occasionally submitting an order to the exchange. This allows us to regard each order as originating from a different source, and hence unrelated to any other order. The arrival of orders of any specified type, and within any specified price range, will then be a Poisson process. (A3) The underlying supply and demand functions are timeindependent during the period of interest. (A4) Market participants prepare and submit their orders without making use of detailed information about the current state of the order book. Opportunistic traders are thus unable to take advantage of temporary anomalies in the order book, although they can use their knowledge of its statistical properties. (This situation is often encountered in very active markets, in which the order book is likely to change before a trader's response to it can be transmitted to the exchange and processed.) Expected order arrival rates will therefore be independent of the order book configuration. (A5) The cancellation rate of unexecuted orders is negligible during the period of interest.
Note that (A1)-(A4) are similar to assumptions made by Garman (1976) . Given these properties, (A5) is also natural since (A3) and (A4) preclude any possibility that a change in market conditions may motivate a trader to cancel an order. (Empirical studies by Coppejans and Domowitz (2001) and Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) have shown that order cancellation is widespread in real financial markets. However most cancellations will be made in response to changing market conditions, and hence generally not during periods when the market is essentially static as assumed here.) As a consequence of properties (A1)-(A3), market participants are unable to acquire or infer new price-sensitive information during the period of interest. ((A1) and (A2) imply that nothing useful can be deduced from order sizes or their temporal clustering, while (A3) precludes the possibility of price-sensitive information being received from other sources.) A trader will therefore have no reason to revise her valuation of the asset, or her expectations regarding future price trends, in response to orders placed by others. Hence in this market there is no rational justification for trading strategies based on technical analysis (which are in any case disallowed by (A4)).
Each of the properties (A1)-(A5) can thus be interpreted in terms of the flow of price-sensitive information between traders and from outside sources. Together they define what may be regarded as a benchmark model of an idealized market with zero information flow.
At any time t, the order book will contain a queue of unexecuted sell orders at prices α 1 (t), α 2 (t), . . . and another queue of unexecuted buy orders at prices β 1 (t), β 2 (t), . . . waiting to be matched with incoming orders. These prices are indexed so that α 1 denotes the lowest (i.e. best) ask price in the book, α 2 the second lowest, and so on. Similarly, β 1 denotes the highest (i.e. best) bid price, β 2 the second highest, etc. The prices will therefore satisfy the inequalities
We are primarily interested in the best ask and bid prices stored in the order book; i.e. α 1 (t) and β 1 (t). However it is also necessary to keep track of all the other orders in the book, as any of these may eventually rise to the top of their respective queue.
Whenever a new order is placed, the contents of the order book are modified according to the following dynamical rules: (R1) If the new order is a sell at the price α, then
• If α β 1 , the new sell order is matched with the current best bid, and the two are executed at the bid price β 1 .
• If α > β 1 , no match is possible, and the new order joins the queue of unexecuted sell orders in the order book. (R2) If the new order is a buy at the price β then
• If β α 1 , the new buy order is matched with the current best ask, and the two are executed at the ask price α 1 .
• If β < α 1 , no match is possible, and the new order joins the queue of unexecuted buy orders in the order book.
Given a particular sequence of orders, these rules completely determine the evolution of the market. In this model, however, orders arrive randomly. Assumptions (A2)-(A4) imply that the arrival of new sell orders at prices not exceeding x will be a Poisson process with parameter λ A (x), where λ A : (0, ∞) → (0, ∞) is an nondecreasing right-continuous function. Similarly, the arrival of new buy orders at prices of at least x will be a Poisson process with parameter λ B (x), where λ B : (0, ∞) → (0, ∞) is a nonincreasing left-continuous function.
If the tick size is non-zero then λ A (x) and λ B (x) will increase or decrease in discrete steps as x increases, with discontinuous jumps at values corresponding to permissible order prices. However these discontinuities are all onesided and cause no difficulties in the following analysis, which requires λ A and λ B merely to be semi-continuous as described in the preceding paragraph. The analysis is therefore applicable regardless of the tick size, or of any other restrictions placed upon the range of permissible prices.
The quantities λ A (x) and λ B (x) represent the average numbers of market participants, per unit of time, submitting orders that are executable at the specified price x. They may therefore be regarded as measures of supply and demand at this price. (Note however that some traders may be deterred from placing orders by the possibility of execution delays, and so order frequencies at a given price will generally be less than they would be if immediate execution was guaranteed. Consequently, λ A (x) and λ B (x) may differ from the levels of supply and demand that would be observed if traders were assured of prompt execution or else were indifferent to delays.)
For technical reasons, it is convenient to suppose that supply and demand do not completely vanish at any price; so λ A (x) > 0 and λ B (x) > 0 for every x ∈ (0, ∞). (Though inessential, this eliminates various special cases that would otherwise require separate consideration.) We will also assume that the excess demand λ B − λ A is positive at some prices and negative at others. (Otherwise supply would exceed demand at every possible price, or vice versa; such a market is of little interest.)
Our initial goal is to determine the statistical properties, in the steady state, of an order book governed by the dynamical rules (R1) and (R2) with Poisson order arrivals as described above and exogenous supply and demand functions λ A and λ B . Of particular interest to market participants (who either do not have access to detailed current information about the order book or else are unable to respond to it immediately) are the steady-state distributions of the best ask and bid prices α 1 and β 1 , since these determine the likely fate of new orders.
For a given price x ∈ (0, ∞), we therefore define A(x) to be the steady-state probability that the order book contains at least one sell order executable at this price; we also define B(x) to be the steady-state probability that the book contains at least one buy order executable at the same price. It proves useful also to define
The function A : [0, ∞] → [0, 1] will then be nondecreasing and right-continuous and, provided we take α 1 = ∞ when the order book contains no sell orders, is the cumulative distribution function for the best ask price α 1 :
Similarly, the function B : [0, ∞] → [0, 1] will be nonincreasing and left-continuous and, provided we take β 1 = 0 when the book contains no buy orders, is the survivor function for the best bid price β 1 :
Note that A(x) + B(x) is the probability that either α 1 x or β 1 x (these alternatives being mutually exclusive). Hence,
Knowledge of the functions A and B can be used to answer questions about the probable state of the order book and to calculate expectations of various quantities. For example, if it is known that the order book always contains both buy and sell orders (which means that B is continuous at 0 and A is continuous at ∞), then the best ask and bid prices α 1 and β 1 will have expectations
. (6) We can also deduce the distribution of transaction prices. There are two types of trades; those in which a pre-existing ask is matched with a new buy order, and those in which a preexisting bid is matched with a new sell order. The frequency with which asks in the price interval (x, x + dx] are executed against new higher-priced buy orders is λ B (x ) dA(x) for some 
provided that A is right-continuous at x 1 and B is leftcontinuous at x 2 . (Note that these continuity conditions may not hold everywhere if the tick size is non-zero.)
How can A(x) and B(x) be determined? One might attempt to derive evolution equations for the time-dependent probabilities P [α 1 (t) x] and P [β 1 (t) x], and then find stationary solutions; but in fact it is difficult to write down a full set of evolution equations. This is because the evolution of P [α 1 (t) x] and P [β 1 (t) x] depends on the distributions of the second best prices α 2 and β 2 (since these may at any time become the best prices). Similarly, the time evolution of the distributions of α 2 and β 2 depends on the distributions of the third best prices, and so on. In principle there is no limit to the number of orders in the book, and so the full evolution equations involve an infinite number of variables.
For this reason, it is impossible to construct a selfcontained evolution equation for the joint distribution of any finite subset of prices from the order book. Hence, if such a data set is viewed as a stochastic process, it must be non-Markov; knowledge of its current state will be insufficient to determine the probability that it will evolve into a specified future state. This argument extends also to the transaction prices, as the probability of a transaction occurring in a given price range and time interval is determined by the current configuration of the order book. In order to determine the probability distributions of future transaction prices, it is therefore not enough to know merely the time and price of the last trade. Thus, the price process is non-Markov.
Much can be deduced about the functions A and B from simple arguments. We begin by defining
The left-continuity of B and the right-continuity of A then imply
Since A + B 1 everywhere, we also have
and, since A(x min ) < A(x max ) with A a non-decreasing function,
The boundary conditions (10) and (11) have probabilistic interpretations. The identities A(x min ) = 0 and A(x max ) = 1 tell us that the best ask price α 1 will almost always exceed x min but almost never exceed x max , while the boundary conditions on B state that the best bid price β 1 will almost always be less than x max but almost never less than x min :
Moreover, since every trade takes place at either the best ask price α 1 or the best bid price β 1 , transaction prices will almost never be less than x min or exceed
The open interval (x min , x max ) will be referred to as the competitive window, since only buy orders at prices exceeding x min and sell orders at prices less than x max have a positive probability of immediate execution against an existing order. New orders submitted at less competitive prices will almost never be matched with existing orders, and will therefore accumulate in the order book.
A more detailed analysis is in order. Let M(t, x) denote the number of sell orders in the order book at time t that are executable at the price x, and let N(t, x) denote the number of buy orders executable at the same price. The evolution of the functions M and N is determined by the random receipt of new orders, so for any fixed price x > 0 and future time t, M(t, x) and N(t, x) are random variables. The following proposition describes the time evolution of 
Proposition 1. Suppose that A(x) and B(x)
are the probabilities that at time t the order book contains, respectively, a sell order executable at the price x and a buy order executable at this price. Then for all prices x 1 and x 2 with 0 < x 1 < x 2 < ∞,
the expressions on the right being well-defined Riemann-Stieltjes integrals.
Proof. See appendix A.
This result has many useful consequences. For example, it implies that the integrals in proposition 1 must be nonnegative in the steady state, since otherwise the numbers of unexecuted orders in the specified intervals would be steadily and perpetually decreasing and would eventually become negative-an impossibility. Hence,
and
Although we are assuming steady-state distributions for the best ask and bid prices α 1 and β 1 , this does not mean that expected order numbers will be static in every price range; indeed we expect orders to accumulate at uncompetitive prices.
Indeed, given any x ∈ (x max , ∞), we see that A = 1 and B = 0 on (x max , x] and so proposition 1 gives
This is strictly positive unless λ A (x) = λ A (x max ): i.e. unless sell orders in the price interval (x max , x] are prohibited. If such orders are ever received, this equation shows that they will accumulate in the order book without ever being executed. Similarly, for any
for x ∈ (0, x min ), indicating the accumulation of buy orders in the price interval [x, x min ). Hence, if 0 < x min and x max < ∞, the competitive window (x min , x max ) will be bounded at the lower end by a steadily growing wall of unexecuted buy orders and at the upper end by a growing wall of unexecuted sell orders. Only at prices between x min and x max will order arrivals be balanced by executions. This is portrayed schematically in figure 1. Now suppose [x 1 , x 2 ] ⊂ (x min , ∞). Then B(x 1 ) < 1, so there is a non-zero probability 1−B(x 1 ) > 0 that at a given time t in the distant future the order book will contain no buy orders at a price of x 1 or higher: i.e. that N(t, x 1 ) = 0. Since this probability remains constant and positive as t → ∞, it follows that N(t, x 1 ) and hence N(t, x 1 )−N(t, x 2 ) must keep returning to zero from time to time. Consequently, the expectation
] cannot be continually growing and so proposition 1 implies that
A similar argument shows that
These equations are central to the following analysis.
Equations (20) and (21) 
Competitive window Figure 1 . Low-priced buy orders and high-priced sell orders remain unexecuted, and accumulate into impenetrable walls surrounding the competitive window, where all trades occur.
Proposition 2.
If (20) and (21) hold on the specified intervals then, for any x ∈ (x min , x max ),
where κ is a constant equal to the overall frequency of transactions in the market. Also, if λ B is continuous at x, the frequency of transactions at prices not exceeding x is
If λ A is continuous at x, then the frequency of transactions at prices of at least x is
Proof. See appendix A.
Thus (1−A)λ B +(1−B)λ A is constant on the competitive window (x min , x max ), its value κ being a direct measure of the market activity. This leads to the following useful result. (25) and thus
The competitive window is non-empty by virtue of (12). Consequently one can always find some x 0 ∈ (x min , x max ), and then the above proposition ensures that
must be exceeded by κ, and also that κ cannot exceed 2λ E :
These inequalities allow one to deduce the approximate location of the competitive window. Indeed, since κ 2λ E , proposition 3 implies that
Thus, if supply and demand at any prices exceed λ E by a factor of two or more, the competitive window will be bounded below by a minimum price x min > 0, and bounded above by a maximum price x max < ∞.
If there is an equilibrium price x E at which supply and demand are precisely equal, then
Since λ E < κ, proposition 3 then implies that x E must lie inside the competitive window:
In this case λ E represents the arrival rate of buy orders (or of sell orders) executable at the equilibrium price x E ; it would also be the frequency of trades if these were permitted only at the equilibrium price, as in a Walrasian market. The inequalities (28) therefore mean that the volume of trade in a limit order market of the kind considered here will always exceed that in a Walrasian market (given similar supply and demand functions), but never by more than a factor of two. However if λ A and λ B have discontinuities (for example, if they are steplike due to a non-zero tick size) then there may be no price at which supply and demand are precisely equal. It is therefore useful to generalize the notion of an equilibrium by choosing x E to be a price at which the supply and demand curves cross, in the sense that λ A λ B on (0, x E ) and λ A λ B on (x E , ∞). Such a price must exist, by virtue of our assumption that the excess demand λ B − λ A is positive at some prices and negative at others.
A price x E chosen in this way will be a genuine equilibrium price if one exists, but may otherwise be viewed as a generalization of this concept. It is readily shown that such a price always lies inside the competitive window or on its boundary:
It is also a simple matter to show that
We are now ready to address the question of how A(x) and B(x) can be determined from the supply and demand functions λ A (x) and λ B (x). Given any x 0 ∈ (x min , x max ), the general solution to equations (20) and (21) on (x min , x max ) has the form
(33) (The proof is straightforward, although some care is needed at points where λ A or λ B is discontinuous.) Once κ is known we can use (26) to determine x min and x max and, provided x min > 0, then take the x 0 x min limit of (32) to obtain
Similarly, if x max < ∞ then the x 0 x max limit of (33) gives
However, these expressions will not satisfy equations (20) and (21) or the boundary conditions (10) unless the correct value of κ is chosen. Indeed, it is readily shown by direct substitution that (34) and (35) represent a solution if and only if
where
or equivalently (after integrating by parts)
with x min (κ) and x max (κ) given by (26). It is not immediately obvious that (36) will admit a root, or that this root will be unique, but in fact this is assured by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If each of the functions λ A and λ B somewhere attains or exceeds the value 2λ E , then there exists a unique
In fact the existence of a unique solution to (36) can be proved under quite general conditions, but this result is adequate for our current purposes. The conditions assumed here also ensure that the competitive window is confined between a non-zero minimum price x min > 0 and a finite maximum price x max < ∞.
As a consequence of proposition 4, we know that there exists exactly one root κ of equation (36); once this has been found, (26) uniquely determines the location of the competitive window (x min , x max ), and then (34) and (35) give the functions A and B on (x min , x max ). In the next two sections we explicitly determine these solutions for a variety of supply and demand functions.
Separable markets
In this section attention is restricted to a special class of markets in which limit orders are never matched with each other, and so must always be stored in the order book until they can be matched with incoming market orders. Such markets, which will be referred to as 'separable', are relatively simple and can be fully analysed using standard techniques from queuing theory. The results obtained in this way are in full agreement with the more general results derived in the preceding section, and also prove useful in section 4.
Given supply and demand functions λ A and λ B , it is useful to define
These are the frequencies of sell and buy orders that are executable against any opposing order. Such orders will be regarded as market orders. If we now define
then the arrival frequency of sell orders executable at a given price x < x A is λ A (x) = µ A . This is also the arrival frequency of sell orders that are executable against any bid whatsoever. Hence, all sell orders executable at the price x < x A must be executable against any bid, and are therefore market orders (according to our terminology). It follows that limit sell orders are confined to the price interval [x A , ∞).
Similarly if
then all buy orders at prices exceeding x B are market orders, and so limit buy orders are confined to the price interval (0, x B ]. The market is said to be separable if contradicting (42) .) This means that, in a separable market, limit buy orders are always priced lower than limit sell orders, and therefore limit orders can never be executed against each other. Figure 2 shows the typical forms of the supply and demand functions in such a market.
In a separable market, therefore, every limit order will remain in the order book until it can be executed against a market order. It is then simple to determine the statistical properties of the order book. Indeed, if p n (x) denotes the stationary probability that the order book contains exactly n unexecuted sell orders executable at the price x (i.e. that M(x) = n) then detailed balance implies
Frequency of orders executable at a given price
Supply and demand in a separable market Figure 2 . Supply and demand in a separable market.
However, if λ A (x) µ A + µ B then (43) does not admit a normalizable solution and no stationary distribution exists.
The probability that the order book contains at least one sell order executable at a given price x is therefore
The expected number of sell orders executable at a given price
while for x x max the number of unexecuted sell orders will grow steadily. A similar argument shows that the expected number of sell orders executable at the price x is
while the expected number of buy orders in the order book executable at x is
It is simple to confirm that A(x) and B(x) satisfy equations (20) and (21) on the appropriate intervals as well as the boundary conditions (10) and (11), and that (1 − A)λ B + (1 − B)λ A takes the value κ = µ A + µ B everywhere on the competitive window (x min , x max ) as required by proposition 2.
In such a market it is also possible to determine the expected time-to-execution of an order at a specified price x ∈ (x min , x max ). The expected number of unexecuted sell orders in a small price interval
, while the arrival rate of sell orders in this interval is λ A (x)−λ A (x− ). The ratio of these quantities is the average life expectancy of such sell orders:
Taking the limit as 0, and using the results obtained above, we find that the time-to-execution of a new sell order at a price
is the arrival frequency of sell orders at prices strictly less than x. Similarly, the expected time-to-execution of a new buy order at a price
is the arrival frequency of buy orders at prices strictly greater than x. The expected times-to-execution are a crucial factor for a trader to consider when deciding at what price to submit an order. This will be discussed in detail in section 4.
Constant elasticities of supply and demand
All the results obtained so far are independent of tick size. In particular, expressions (34) and (35) for A(x) and B(x) are valid regardless of any restrictions imposed on the range of allowable prices. Hence there should be no dramatic change in the form of these functions, nor therefore in the statistical properties of the order book, if the tick size is gradually reduced to zero so that the range of permissible prices becomes continuous. In other words, tick size should have little effect on the properties of the model market. For this reason, it is natural to eliminate this parameter altogether by focusing on markets in which the tick size is so small (compared with the typical bid-ask spread) that the range of admissible prices can be regarded as continuous. In terms of our model, this is realized by supposing that the supply and demand functions λ A and λ B are fully continuous on (0, ∞).
A vanishing tick size would be problematic in the absence of property (A4), as rival traders with detailed information about the current state of the order book could repeatedly outbid or undercut each other by arbitrarily small amounts in order to obtain priority. In this model, however, traders are unable to respond to specific orders placed by their rivals and so this situation does not arise. (Of course, impatient traders are still motivated to price their orders competitively as this increases the probability of prompt execution.)
Note that if λ A and λ B are both continuous and differentiable then (20) and (21) reduce to the differential equations
As an example we now consider a market in which the tick-size is negligible and the elasticities of supply and demand are both price-independent, with constant values η A > 0 and η B > 0 respectively. The supply and demand functions then have the form
for some constant λ E > 0. (The numeraire is assumed to have been chosen so that the equilibrium price x E is exactly 1, and hence λ A (1) = λ B (1) = λ E .) Since λ A and λ B are unbounded, proposition 3 implies that the competitive window will be bounded by a minimum price x min > 0 and a maximum price x max < ∞. The first step is to solve the equation H (κ) = 0, where the function H is defined by (37). If η A = η B we find that
from which it follows that
and hence, using (34) and (35),
. This time, the same procedure yields
for x ∈ [x min , x max ]. With the given supply and demand functions λ A and λ B , these are the only solutions to equations (20) and (21) satisfying the boundary conditions (10) and (11), and therefore describe the unique steady-state distributions of the best ask and bid prices.
The best ask price α 1 and bid price β 1 have probability density functions A (x) and −B (x), both of which are supported on the competitive window [x min , x max ]. These density functions can be used to calculate expectations of any functions of α 1 or β 1 . For example, the best ask price has expectation
η A = η B = η (65) while, provided that η A = 1 = η B , the best bid price has expectation Given any x ∈ [x min , x max ], the frequency of trades at prices less than x can be obtained using proposition 2, and is found to be
is the overall frequency of trades, the density function for the price of a random trade is
if x ∈ [x min , x max ], or zero otherwise. The price X T of a random trade then has expectation The functions A(x) and B(x) given by (60) and (61) are the unique solutions to (20) and (21), subject to the boundary conditions (10) and (11), for any supply and demand functions λ A (x) and λ B (x) having the specified elasticities η A , η B inside the interval [x min , x max ], regardless of their values elsewhere. It follows that the stationary distributions of the transaction prices and the best ask and bid prices are determined entirely by the values of η A and η B within the competitive window.
It is interesting to note that the overall frequency of transactions in the market can be written as
where ν = η A /η B is the ratio of the elasticities. Figure 6 shows the dependence of trade frequency on the natural logarithm of ν.
We see that κ always exceeds the trade frequency λ E in a Walrasian market, in which all trades take place at the equilibrium price x E and hence there is no execution of buy orders at prices less than x E or sell orders at prices exceeding x E . (In fact this is a special case of the general result derived in section 1.) In a limit order market, however, there is no fixed execution price; buy orders at prices slightly below x E , and sell orders at prices slightly above x E are also executable (though not necessarily immediately). Indeed, the model market described here can achieve up to 64.8% more trades than a Walrasian market. (This is achieved when ν = 1.)
Of considerable interest to traders is the market depth at a specified price x ∈ (x min , x max ); that is, the numbers M(x) and N(x) of sell and buy orders in the book executable against an incoming counter-order at the price x. These quantities are regarded as random variables in this model, and so we seek to understand their statistical properties. In particular, it would be useful to know the probability p n (x) that the book contains exactly n sell orders executable at a given price x ∈ (0, ∞)
and the probability p −n (x) that it contains exactly n buy orders executable at this price:
The earlier results impose constraints on the possible values of these probabilities. Indeed, since A(x) is the probability that the order book contains one or more sell orders at the price x, while B(x) is the probability that it contains one or more buy orders executable at this price, it follows that
Also, the probability that the book contains no buy or sell orders executable at the price x is known to be
However, nothing more can be deduced without further work. Despite considerable efforts, I have been unable to derive expressions for the individual probabilities p n (x) and p −n (x) for n > 0. However, in the absence of precise analytic results, estimates of these probabilities can be obtained from Monte Carlo simulations.
Numerous simulations were performed in order to estimate the probabilities p n (x) and p −n (x) at various prices and for various constant elasticities η A and η B . In every case, the ratios p n (x)/p n−1 and p −n /p −(n−1) appeared to be almost completely independent of n for n = 1, 2 . . ., the underlying distributions being very nearly geometric. Thus, for fixed elasticities η A and η B and at a fixed price x, the probabilities have the approximate form
for suitable functions γ, σ : (x min , x max ) → (0, 1). In fact equations (73) and (74) These expressions were found to give a surprisingly good fit to the Monte Carlo data at all prices and for all choices of supply and demand functions that were considered. However, the fit was not quite perfect: when the elasticities of supply and demand differed substantially, the Monte Carlo data displayed small but statistically significant departures from the distribution predicted by (76) and (77). Nonetheless, the twosided geometric model provides a very useful approximation. For any k 1, the sum
dictate that γ (x) = A(x)/[1 − B(x)] and σ (x) = B(x)/[1 − A(x)], so (75) gives
k−1 is the probability that there are at least k sell orders in the book executable at the price x, and hence that the kth ask price α k does not exceed x:
Differentiating this expression gives an approximate density function for α k . Assuming the probabilities given by (75), the expected numbers of stored sell and buy orders executable at the price x are, respectively,
Differentiating (79) and (80), we obtain approximate expressions for the density of sell orders and buy orders in the book at a price x ∈ (x min , x max ): 
(82) In fact these expressions are in very close agreement with the results of all the Monte Carlo simulations that were performed, as can be seen from figure 7 which shows a typical set of results.
A trader preparing to submit an order is generally concerned with the expected time to execution of the order. This can also be estimated. The arrival frequency of sell orders priced between x and x + dx is λ A (x) dx, so if each is stored in the book for an average period of T A (x) while awaiting execution then the expected number in the book at a given time is T A (x)λ A (x) dx. But this must be just u(x) dx, where u(x) is the density of sell orders in the book at this price; hence the average time to execution of a newly submitted sell order at a price x ∈ (x min , x max ) is
Similarly, the average time to execution of a newly submitted buy order at the same price is found to be
Optimal trading strategies
When setting the price of a sell order, a seller will take into account not only its expected time-to-execution but also the expected price she will receive. The latter is easily calculated if the function B is known. Suppose she submits a sell order at the price x. For a given β > x, there is a probability −dB = −B (β) dβ that the best bid will be in the price range [β, β + dβ), and hence that the incoming sell order will be executed against this bid. There is also a probability 1 − B(x) that it will not immediately be executed, but stored in the order book and later executed at the price x. Taking both of these possibilities into account, the expected execution price will be
This exceeds the expected execution price E[β 1 ] of a market sell order by the amount
By raising her order price by a small amount dx, the seller increases the expected sale price by P A (x) dx, where P A = 1 − B is the derivative of P A . However, this also causes a variation T A (x) dx in the expected time to execution (where T A denotes the derivative of T A ). The seller will generally want to maximize an objective function of the form
, where c A is a positive constant characterizing her level of impatience and representing the effective cost per unit time to execution. This may take into account factors such as opportunity cost and unearned interest due to the delayed sale, as well as the seller's anxiety that a sudden change in market conditions may occur before the sale is completed.
Any sell order at a price x x min is effectively a market order, since it is sure to be executed immediately against the best bid. For practical purposes, all such orders are identical; thus, it is permissible as well as convenient to suppose that market sell orders are always represented here by orders at the price x min . (They could equally well be represented by orders at some lower price, but this would make no difference to the resulting distribution of unexecuted orders within the competitive window or the statistics of actual trades.)
On the other hand, a sell order at a price of x max or higher will never be executed, so such an order will never be submitted by a rational seller (since c A > 0 by assumption). The seller's problem is therefore to find the price x * ∈ [x min , x max ) that maximizes E A (x). If this maximum is located at x min then she will prefer a market order; otherwise, a limit order. However, the order will only be placed if E A (x * ) > V A where V A denotes the value of the asset to the seller after allowing for any transaction costs.
It turns out that this optimization problem is solved by finding the roots of the equation
To reach this result without too many digressions, we assume that T A is continuous on [x min , x max ) and differentiable on (x min , x max ), and increases without limit as the price approaches x max so that T A > 0 on (x min , x max ) and f A (x) → 0 as x → x max . (After all, the expected time-to-execution must always be an increasing function of the order price.) We also assume that f A is continuous on (x min , x max ). These assumptions are reasonable, and certainly hold for markets of the kind considered in the previous section. Now, suppose that the seller is relatively impatient, with
Since E A is decreasing on (x min , x max ) and continuous at x min , its maximum will be attained at x * = x min ; a market order is therefore optimal. (Of course, the seller must still check that the expected proceeds justify the sale.)
Alternatively, suppose f A exceeds c A somewhere in (x min , x max ). Since lim x→x max f A (x) < c A , the continuity of f A implies that equation (86) has roots in (x min , x max ). But E A = (f A − c A )T A , so these roots correspond precisely with the stationary points of E A ; we are interested in the local maxima. A particular root x of (86) will be a local maximum of E A if and only if E A > 0 at prices slightly less than x, and E A < 0 at prices slightly more than x; or equivalently, since E A = (f A − c A )T A , if and only if x has a neighbourhood on which f A is strictly decreasing. (Since f A decreases towards zero at x max , there must be at least one such root.)
Having thus located all the local maxima of E A , one must then evaluate E A at each one and also at x min to determine the global maximum of E A on [x min , x max ). If this is located at x min , then a market order is optimal; however, if it is located at a local minimum x * ∈ (x min , x max ) then a limit order at this price is preferred. (As before, the seller must still check that the expected profit from the sale is sufficient to meet her own requirements.)
In summary, therefore, this analysis shows that a rational seller will consider placing a limit order at a price x ∈ (x min , x max ) only if
• f A (x) = c A , where c A characterizes the seller's level of impatience; • x has a neighbourhood on which f A is strictly decreasing;
If there is no price x ∈ (x min , x max ) at which all these conditions are satisfied, then a market order will be preferred. It follows that no rational seller will submit a limit order at a price x for which f A (x) > 0. Moreover, all rational sellers who submit orders at a given price x ∈ (x min , x max ) must have the same level of impatience f A (x).
Also, we see that a limit sell order at the price x can be optimal only if f A (x) = c A and also c A < P A (x)/T A (x); and hence, only if
Thus, limit orders by rational sellers will be confined to the price range in which P A /T A (as well f A = P A /T A ) is decreasing. Assuming that P A /T A has a single maximum at some point x A ∈ (x min , x max ), it follows that rational sellers will never submit a limit order in the price range (x A , x max ). A precisely analogous argument can be made for buyers, and leads to a similar criterion for deciding between market and limit orders. A buyer will seek to minimize the cost function E B (x) = c B T B (x) − P B (x) where c B is a positive constant characterizing her level of impatience: (x) ] is the expected reduction in execution price achieved by submitting a limit buy order at the price x rather than a market order, and T B (x) is the expected time-to-execution for this limit order (given approximately by (84)). In this case, the optimal price for a limit order is a root of the equation f B (x) = c B located in the subset of (x min , x max ) on which f B is increasing, where
If no such root exists, or if c B > P B /T B , then a market order is preferred (though it may not be submitted unless the expected profit is adequate). A rational buyer will never submit a limit order at a price exceeding x B , where x B is the price at which P B /T B attains its maximum on (x min , x max ). These results have some interesting consequences. If all sellers in the market are assumed to be rational then no limit sell orders should be submitted at prices below some x A , and if all buyers are rational then no limit buy order should be submitted at prices above x B . It then follows that
where µ A and µ B are the frequencies of market sell and market buy orders, respectively. Consequently
and therefore, since
(Expression (94) holds at x B due to the right-continuity of A and λ A , while (95) holds at x A due to the left-continuity of B and λ B .) If x B < x A , the market is separable in the sense defined in section 2 and is easily analysed. For any x 0 ∈ (x B , x A ) we then have 
Figure 8. Order optimization in a market with constant elasticities η A = 20, η B = 80. In each figure, the blue curve shows the implied level of impatience of a rational trader submitting a limit order at the specified price. The black curve is the boundary of the region in which limit orders are preferred to market orders.
Using this identity to eliminate κ from (94) and (95) then reproduces expressions (46) and (49). Using expressions (53) and (54) in (87) and (89), we then obtain
These functions give the level of impatience of traders submitting limit orders at the price x. The assumed rationality of traders means that f A should be decreasing on [x A , x max ], except possibly at prices where λ A = 0 (since this indicates an absence of sell orders). Similarly, f B (x) should be increasing on [x min , x B ] except where λ B = 0. These rules provide a simple test for the rationality of traders. It is straightforward to create examples of separable markets in which these conditions are satisfied. (For example, taking
, which is increasing, as required in a market with exclusively rational participants.) However, if x A < x B the situation is much more complicated. In this case, limit orders can be matched against each other and executed at prices within an 'inner window' [x A , x B ] ⊂ (x min , x max ). Rather than being sandwiched between two accumulating walls of uncompetitive orders, this inner window would be bounded at the lower end by a price interval (x min , x A ) in which no sell orders are received, and at the upper end by an interval (x B , x max ) in which no buy orders are received.
In fact it proves very difficult to construct a model market with these properties in which x A < x B , and it may be that such a market cannot exist or else will have grossly unrealistic features. If this conjecture proves to be correct then the model will become very simple, as any market with exclusively rational traders will be separable and can therefore be fully described and understood using the results of section 2. In particular, it will mean that the two sides of the order book are statistically independent of each other. (The accumulation of unexecuted asks and the accumulation of unexecuted bids in the order book could thus be regarded as independent stochastic processes.) If this could be established, it would considerably simplify attempts to understand the statistical properties of the order book.
It is natural to ask whether the same conjecture might continue to hold in less restrictive models, or even in real markets during periods without clear price trends (when the market is most likely to resemble the steady-state model described here). This question will be addressed in future work.
Concluding remarks
This model provides a clear illustration of the way in which microstructural effects can generate price fluctuations, even when the underlying levels of supply and demand remain static and there is no flow of information. Such fluctuations are purely consequences of mismatches between the immediate needs of buyers and sellers, and are described by nonMarkov stochastic processes with little resemblance to the more familiar Itô and Lévy processes generally used to model financial data.
In a real market, prices are also affected by a variety of economic and business factors unconnected with market microstructure. It is thus natural to regard price variations as being made up of two distinct components with quite different stochastic properties: microstructurally generated fluctuations of the type described above, and movements resulting from market forces-that is, from changing levels of supply and demand. The reality is that we still know relatively little about the stochastic properties of either component.
Price data from real financial markets are unlikely to reveal much about the microstructural contribution, which cannot easily be disentangled from the effects of market forces. A practical way to deal with this problem is to focus on markets where these forces are simple and well understood, so that the microstructural effects can be isolated. If such markets are not found in the real world, they can readily be created in laboratories or classrooms, or even as computer simulations. For example it is straightforward to set up and study a market having properties (A1)-(A5). (Indeed, this was done in section 4 and also in the study by Luckock and Skipper (2001) .) However, where mathematical analysis is feasible, this will generally offer more insight.
One of the main strengths of the model presented here is that it is fairly amenable to this type of analysis and yields relatively straightforward expressions for a number of quantities of interest. This makes it possible to investigate not only the way in which order flows determine the state of the order book, but also the way in which the properties of the order book may influence order flows. Clearly, a proper understanding of this interaction will be an essential ingredient for any complete theory of market microstructure.
An important question is whether the model market resembles real markets under some circumstances. Perhaps its most striking feature is the confinement of price fluctuations to the competitive window. This is not caused by an absence of supply or demand outside this window, but by the accumulation of uncompetitive orders into impenetrable walls restricting the range of prices at which new orders can be executed. The same phenomenon will also occur in real markets, provided that the supply and demand curves remain relatively static.
Analysis of the model also yields the stationary distributions of the transaction prices and the best ask and bid prices, although these distributions are unlikely to be exactly reproduced in real markets which do not fully satisfy all of the assumptions (A1)-(A5).
However, some of these assumptions will be approximately true in real markets during brief periods in which there are no clear price trends. For example, in the absence of significant announcements and events, of clear market sentiment, and of heavy trading by large investors, one might expect supply and demand to remain fairly static and investors to act more or less independently for periods of minutes or even hours. During such periods, little will happen to prompt the cancellation of unfilled orders; most will be left in the book while traders await new information or signs of a clear market direction. Assumptions (A2)-(A4) should therefore hold at least approximately. During such periods, (A4) also seems innocuous; even if significant numbers of traders are able to react quickly enough to seize the occasional opportunities created by transient order-book fluctuations, it is questionable whether this ability will substantially affect the timeindependent statistical features of the market.
(It is less clear whether (A1) is innocuous in this context; it is certainly unrealistic, as order sizes vary in real markets. However the assumption of fixed order size is central to this and many other microstructural models, as few analytic results can be obtained without it. The current consensus appears to be that, though unrealistic, this assumption does not dramatically affect the properties of the market. For example, Smith et al (2002) have claimed that the results of their market simulations were qualitatively unaffected when order sizes were allowed to vary, provided the size distributions had thin tails.) Thus, the model is most likely to resemble a real market in periods when it is untroubled by external news or concerted action by major players: that is, at times when there is little information entering the market or diffusing through it. However, when the flow of information in the market increases, investors of all sizes will start forming views and adjusting their positions, causing supply and demand to vary; changing expectations will prompt traders to revise or cancel their outstanding orders and traders will pay increased attention to the actions of their rivals, and respond quickly to new opportunities or dangers. In such conditions, assumptions (A1)-(A5) become untenable and the market's resemblance to the model will diminish.
This argument suggests that the quantity of information flowing within a particular market over some period might be measured by the extent to which the observed properties of the market differ from those of the model. In the absence of information flow, this difference should be small. Conversely, the model proposed here is likely to offer less insight into real markets during periods of rapid information flow. In such situations a more realistic description is likely to be achieved with models that permit new orders to be correlated with the contents of the order book, such as those of Challet and Stinchcombe (2001) , Daniels et al (2001), and Chiarelli and Iori (2002) . Unfortunately, however, these models appear to be less amenable to theoretical analysis and generally rely on numerical simulation. (The second of these models has been analysed in some depth by Smith et al (2002) , but this has resulted in few quantitative predictions expressible in closed form.)
The primary strength of the model presented here is its simplicity and tractability, rather than its ability to accurately describe market dynamics. Nonetheless, it may be expected to provide a reasonable qualitative description during periods when the market is fairly static, and this may be a good starting point for the development of more versatile models.
Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose a new sell order arrives during a brief time interval [t, t + t] . If the new sell order price α is less than or equal to the best bid price β 1 , these two orders are matched and executed and so, for x β 1 , the number N(t, x) of remaining buy orders executable at the price x will decrease by one. (If the order book contains no buy orders then we take β 1 = 0.) Alternatively, if α > β 1 , then no match is possible and the new sell order takes its place in the queue, increasing by one the number M(t, x) of sell orders executable at a given price x α. For an arbitrary choice of x > 0, the changes in the values of M (t, x) and N(t, x) (If the order book contains no sell orders, we take α 1 = ∞.) These expressions precisely encapsulate the dynamical rules (R1) and (R2). During an infinitesimal time interval t, there is a probability λ A (x) t of receiving a new sell order at a price not exceeding x, and a probability λ B (x) t of receiving a new buy order at a price of at least x. (There is a negligible probability that more than one order will be received.) The expected increases in the quantities M (t, x) and N(t, x) over this time interval are hence
Given x 1 > 0 and x 2 > x 1 , the number of unexecuted sell orders in the price interval (x 1 , x 2 ] at time t has expectation E[M(t, x 2 ) − M(t, x 1 )]. Using the above result, the rate of change of this quantity is found to be
where we have now taken expectations with respect to α 1 and β 1 . We know that α 1 has distribution function A(x) while β 1 has survivor function B(x), and so the last equation can be written as
after a straightforward integration by parts. A similar argument gives
The existence of all of these Riemann-Stieltjes integrals is assured by the right-continuity of λ A and A, the left-continuity of λ B and B, and the boundedness of these functions on [x 1 , x 2 ].
Proof of proposition 2. Let x ∈ (x min , x max ) be given. Then (21) implies that
But B(x min ) = 1, so this gives
Since A is continuous at x min and B is continuous at x max on account of the boundary conditions (11), it follows from (7) that the frequency of transactions in the price interval [x min , x max ]-and hence the overall transaction frequency κ-is
as claimed, regardless of which price x ∈ (x min , x max ) is chosen. (It can be directly verified using (20) and (21) that this expression is indeed constant on (x min , x max ).) Also if λ B is continuous at x then either λ A (x) = 0 or B is continuous at x (as can be seen by taking the x 1 → x 2 limit of (20)). In either case, (7) then implies that λ T (x min , x) = Proof of proposition 3. Taking the x → x − max limit of (22) gives
x max , we then take the x 1 → x − max limit of (16) to get
and use (A.1) to show that λ A (x 2 ) κ. Also, for any x 1 < x max we know that
0), and hence λ A (x 1 ) κ. In fact this inequality must be strict, as we shall now see, or else a contradiction would be obtained.
Indeed, suppose that λ A (x 1 ) = κ for some x 1 < x max . We know that λ A κ on (0, x max ), and since λ A is nondecreasing we now have λ A = κ on [x 1 , x max ) and hence λ A (x max −) = κ. Equation (A.1) then gives = 0 (since λ B > 0 by assumption), and so lim x→x − max A(x) = 1. Moreover, (21) and the constancy of λ A on [x 1 , x max ) together imply that A is also constant on [x 1 , x max ), so it follows that A(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [x 1 , x max ). But this is inconsistent with the definition of x max , which ensures that A(x) < 1 for all x < x max . Hence there can be no price x 1 < x max with λ A (x 1 ) = κ, and so the earlier inequality must be strict; i.e. λ A (x 1 ) < κ for any x 1 < x max . Similar arguments show that λ B < κ on (x min , ∞) and λ B κ on (0, x min ]. The stated result then follows.
Proof of proposition 4.
For κ ∈ (λ E , 2λ E ] we define H (κ) by (37) with x min (κ) ≡ inf{x : λ B (x) < κ} and x max (κ) ≡ sup{x : λ A (x) < κ}. (The assumption that both λ A and λ B attain or exceed the value 2λ E ensures that x min (κ) > 0 and x max (κ) < ∞ ∀κ ∈ (λ E , 2λ E ], and hence that all terms in (37) are defined.) One finds that lim κ λ E H (κ) = λ −2 E , so it is convenient to extend the domain of
Using integration by parts we can rewrite (37) as
where the functions
are readily shown to be continuous and strictly decreasing on [λ E , 2λ E ]; moreover, dR/dκ
is also continuous and strictly decreasing on [λ E , 2λ E ] and that
We now obtain a lower bound for dH/dκ
. This implies that x min (κ) < x 0 and x 0 < x max (κ), and the stated result immediately follows.)
We now prove that
λ E , but this is omitted for brevity.
Since λ A (x min (κ)) λ E and λ B (x max (κ)) λ E for κ > λ E , the earlier result implies that dH/dκ
In particular, H (2λ E ) 0. Since H (κ) is continuous and strictly decreasing on [λ E , 2λ E ], with H (λ E ) > 0 and H (2λ E ) 0, there must be exactly one κ ∈ [λ E , 2λ E ] for which H (κ) = 0.
Appendix B. The theorem of Domowitz and Wang
In appendix A of Domowitz and Wang (1994) (hereafter DW), the authors attempt to derive the steady-state conditional probability distribution for the numbers {Y j +1 , . . . , Y R } of unexecuted sell orders at prices {p j +1 , . . . , p R }, given that the best bid price B m currently has the value p j . Their argument is based on the assertion that the steady-state distribution satisfies the following condition:
'during a small interval t, the probability of Y i (j + 1 i R) increasing from y i to y i + 1 must equal that of Y i decreasing from y i + 1 to y i '.
In fact this statement is correct only in the absence of conditions on other variables that may be correlated with Y i . It is not generally true when conditions are placed on the best bid price B m , as then one must also take into account the possibility of changes in B m . To see that the quoted assertion is true in the absence of conditions on other variables, we note that only the following instantaneous changes in the value of Y i are possible: and so for the steady-state distribution we have λ(n; n + 1) t = λ(n + 1; n) t (B.4) in agreement with the quoted assertion. If H n denotes the subset of the sample space in which Y i n, with H n its complement, then this argument can be summarized by the following two observations:
• the steady-state probability of a transition from H n to H n must be the same as the probability of a transition from H n to H n • a transition H n → H n necessarily corresponds to a change in the value of Y i from y n to y n + 1, while a transition H n → H n corresponds to a change in the value of Y i from y n + 1 to y n .
The second observation reflects the fact that the possible values of Y i form a one-dimensional lattice, with transitions only possible between neighbouring points on this lattice. Hence, there is only one way out of H n and one way into H n ; and in the steady-state distribution there must be the same frequency of transitions in both directions. The situation is more complicated when the best bid price B m is also specified, as now we must consider transition rates between neighbouring points in the two-dimensional lattice of possible values of Y i and B m . There is more than one way into any subset of this lattice, and more than one way out, and so the balance between flow in and flow out does not provide a simple equality between a pair of transition rates. Consequently, the quoted assertion does not hold. (B.9) In appendix B of DW, it is implicitly assumed that the quantity E(n, j ) vanishes. However, this assumption is unfounded. Indeed, one can easily construct counter-examples where E(n, j ) takes non-zero values.
The non-vanishing of E(n, j ) implies that the probability of Y i (j + 1 i R) increasing from y i to y i + 1 while B m has the value p j is not generally equal to that of Y i decreasing from y i + 1 to y i while B m = p j . The assertion quoted above is therefore untrue when conditions are placed imposed on B m as well as Y i , which is the case in appendix B of DW. The proof of theorem 1 in DW is therefore fallacious. Moreover, since this theorem was used to prove all the other theorems in this paper and in Bollerslev et al (1997) , they are also invalid.
One might attempt to correct the error in DW by including the non-vanishing quantity E (n, j ) (B.10)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the rate at which sell orders at the price p i are crossed against newly received buy orders at the same price, the second term represents the rate at which sell orders at the price p i are picked off by hits, and the third term represents the rate at which sell orders at the price p i are currently being cancelled. This is the corrected form of the first equation displayed in appendix B of DW, from which the last term had been omitted. Unfortunately, the inclusion of this term invalidates their subsequent arguments.
